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Abstract: Over recent decades, the relationship between the United Kingdom (UK) and its 
Overseas Territories (OTs) has been a generally strong one, with political and economic 
safeguards in place, bolstered by increasing levels of support from the European Union (EU). 
Of course there have been strains and tensions in relations, but significant advantages have 
accrued to the territories. This article takes as its starting-point several key observations made 
previously by experts in the field and uses them to analyse the condition of relations between 
the UK and its territories within the context of recent events. In particular, the claim by Godfrey 
Baldacchino that non-sovereign territories benefit from the support of a “benevolent mainland 
patron” is considered. Based on a review of recent statements, newspaper articles and policy 
documents, this article argues that the UK’s benevolence to its OTs has been placed under 
serious pressure by three recent and unrelated events: the UK’s decision to leave the EU; its 
sub-optimal response to the damage caused in several territories by Hurricane Irma; and the 
resolve of the UK Parliament to impose stricter controls on the OTs’ offshore financial sectors. 
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Introduction 
 
There are 14 United Kingdom Overseas Territories (UKOTs): two in Europe (Gibraltar 
and the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in Cyprus); five in the Caribbean 
(Anguilla, British Virgin Islands, Cayman Islands, Montserrat and Turks and Caicos Islands); 
three in the South Atlantic (Falkland Islands; South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands; and 
St Helena, Ascension and Tristan da Cunha), and four that stand alone (the British Indian Ocean 
Territory, the British Antarctic Territory, Bermuda and Pitcairn). Most have permanent 
populations, and the number of inhabitants range from 64,000 in Bermuda to about 40 in 
Pitcairn. The total population in the UKOTs is around 250,000. Apart from their different 
locations (for example, St Helena is one of the most remote islands in the world) and population 
size, there are crucial differences in their economies and constitutional relationships with the 
UK. In terms of their economic profiles, the Falkland Islands, Gibraltar, Bermuda and the 
Cayman Islands have the most successful economies based on industries such as fishing, 
tourism and financial services. The Falkland Islands has a GDP per capita of around 
US$93,000, with Bermuda coming in a close second with around US$86,000 (UKOTA, 2016a, 
p. 6). As noted financial services are very important: the Cayman Islands is the world’s sixth 
largest banking centre and the largest domicile for hedge funds; Bermuda is the leading centre 
for captive insurance; while the British Virgin Islands is the world leader for company 
incorporation (European Parliament, 2017, p. 152). In contrast, the economies of Pitcairn, St 
Helena and Montserrat are the frailest, due to their small size and isolation (Pitcairn and St 
Helena) and the legacy of a major natural disaster (Soufrière Hills volcano eruption in 
Montserrat since 1995). Such differences impact on the territories’ current relations with the 
UK. 
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The constitutional relationship between the UK and the territories, although based on 
common principles, also has some noteworthy differences. The relationship is underpinned by 
several Acts of Parliament. For example, the British Settlement Acts 1887 and 1945 provide 
the statutory legal basis for the constitutions of some territories such as the Falkland Islands 
and Pitcairn; while the majority of the territories in the Caribbean are overseen by the West 
Indies Act 1962. In addition, constitutional arrangements have been affected by particular 
events, such as corruption allegations in the Turks and Caicos Islands (Clegg, 2012). 
Consequently, there are differences in the constitutions, and in the balance of power with the 
UK. Overall, there are areas of policy reserved for the UK: these include defence, external 
affairs, internal security and the public service. Meanwhile, the territory governments manage 
other aspects of policy such as the economy, immigration and education. However, territories 
such as Bermuda and Gibraltar have more autonomy than, for example, the Turks and Caicos 
Islands and Pitcairn. So: in Bermuda and Gibraltar, the Governor does not chair the local 
Cabinet; in St Helena, the Governor also oversees finance and shipping; and, in some of the 
Caribbean territories, the Governor exercises oversight over aspects of international finance; 
and, in Bermuda, it is more difficult for the UK to legislate by Order in Council (Hendry & 
Dickson, 2011, pp. 64-65). 
 
In recent decades, with the notable exception of the volcanic eruption in Montserrat 20 
years ago, there has been relative social, economic and political stability in the territories. All 
of them (bar Anguilla and the Turks and Caicos Islands) have created more sophisticated and 
devolved constitutions, and most have seen sizeable economic growth. These trends have been 
noted by the academic community, which has highlighted the apparent advantages of their 
particular status (McElroy & De Albuquerque, 1995; Baldacchino & Milne, 2009; Clegg & 
Pantojas-Garcia, 2009; Rezvani, 2014). More particularly Baldacchino has argued that non-
sovereignty offers “the best of both worlds” (2006a, p. 49). Expanding on this idea, 
Baldacchino (2006a, p. 49) suggested that this status provides: 
 
… many of the benefits associated with political sovereignty while delegating 
responsibilities, enjoying security and reaping the material benefits of remaining in 
association with a larger, and typically richer, albeit often reluctant, patron. 
 
In a slighter later article, Baldacchino noted the benefits that come from the support of 
a “larger, benevolent ‘mainland’ patron” (2006b, p. 861, emphasis added). In the same article 
he also indicated that the patron can be “reliable” and a “protector” (2006b, p. 856; p. 860). In 
a third piece, Baldacchino and Milne (2009, p. 3) observed that “sub-national (mainly island) 
jurisdictions show a remarkable pattern of mutual accommodation and convenience between 
large (often metropolitan) states and their offshore islands”. The result is that “throughout the 
world, partially independent territories tend to be wealthier and more secure than their 
sovereign state counterparts” (Rezvani, 2014, p. vii). Various kinds of support can be provided 
by, or derived from, the patron, including political security, aid-financed infrastructure, natural 
disaster relief, protection and defence of offshore financial centres, diplomatic representation, 
and access to larger markets such as the European Union (EU) (Baldacchino, 2006b; Kelman, 
Davies, Mitchell, Orr & Conrich, 2006; Rezvani, 2014; Veenendaal, 2016). Ultimately, “the 
connection to the governing state provides [the territories] a psychological crutch which, in 
times of need, is hopefully transformed into a physical crutch” (Kelman et al., 2006, p. 569). 
As Rezvani argued, metropolitan powers “… are not only authorised, but have a duty to 
intervene” (2014, p. 50). 
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Despite what has been outlined in the previous paragraph, the UKOTs are now facing 
several challenges, which highlight certain vulnerabilities that come with, and not in spite of, 
their close ties to the UK. This in turn has raised serious questions about the UK’s benevolence 
and reliability, and the territories’ security and economic well-being going forward. In 
particular, three recent and unrelated events have brought into sharper focus the constraints and 
drawbacks inherent in the relations of these OTs with the UK: the effects of the UK’s imminent 
departure from the EU (‘Brexit’) slated for March 2019; the significant devastation wrought 
by Hurricane Irma on the territories in the Caribbean in September 2017, and the UK’s half-
hearted response to this; and a more critical view of the territories’ offshore financial sector 
taken by the UK Parliament. These, in turn, have led the territories to explore additional poles 
of support beyond London. 
 
This paper 
 
In order to provide the necessary depth and nuance to this paper, I use a range of 
documents; most of which are in the public domain. The UK Parliament, and particularly its 
committees, have taken a keen interest in the UKOTs; thus, their reports and the associated 
evidence provide a useful framework. The views of politicians and officials are well 
represented, and their words are often used to show the polarising nature of recent events which 
are the focus of this paper. The ability of the territories to produce similarly sized reports is 
more limited, but several of them, including the Falkland Islands and the British Virgin Islands, 
have published important contributions to the Brexit debate in particular. This paper is also 
informed by recent studies I have undertaken for the United Kingdom Overseas Territories 
Association (UKOTA) and the European Parliament. Speaking with representatives and 
stakeholders on and off the record has been invaluable in helping me to shape the tenor of the 
paper; most particularly, the territories’ deep frustrations with some aspects of UK policy, but 
also a still strong underlying (yet perhaps fracturing) relationship with London. Finally, the 
conceptual approach offered by the academic literature has been crucial in allowing me to 
provide a coherent and contextualised critique of recent UK policy towards its territories; 
starting first with Brexit. 
 
Brexit and its discontents 
 
The referendum campaign that led to the vote for the UK to leave the EU on 23 June 
2016, perhaps unsurprisingly, did not focus on the territories to any great extent. What coverage 
there was focused largely on Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands and the risks posed to their 
security if the UK left the EU. One high profile article was written by the former Conservative 
Foreign Secretary William Hague (2016). Under the headline ‘Leaving the EU would be 
disastrous for the Falklands, Gibraltar and Ulster’, Hague explained that the guaranteed 
solidarity of all 28 EU member states in recognising British sovereignty over Gibraltar and the 
Falkland Islands was extremely important. Both territories are noted in the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the EU, which offers them considerable certainty and support from EU member 
states (Official Journal of the EU, 2012). All member state signatories are committed to the 
position that Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands are UKOTs. As Benwell and Pinkerton (2016, 
p. 10) argued in relation to Gibraltar:  
 
[the EU has emerged as a kind of ] guarantor’ power … the EU provides a kind of 
security … that both transcends and mitigates political fluctuations in Westminster, the 
frequent ‘churn’ of Foreign Office ministers and potential shifts in UK government 
foreign policy priorities. 
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The Falkland Islands government concurs. Roger Edwards, a member of the legislative 
assembly, argued that with Brexit “We may well lose the support of the rest of Europe, and 
may well see Spain and possibly other member states of Europe give greater support to 
Argentina over its mistaken and illegal claim to the Falkland Islands” (House of Lords 
European Union Committee 2017c, p. 5). With the potential loss of these safeguards, Hague 
feared that British sovereignty would become less secure. 
 
However, the arguments of the ‘Remainers’ were challenged by much of the right-wing 
media (e.g. The Telegraph, 2016) and by many Conservative Ministers and MPs, even those 
with purportedly strong links to the territories. For instance, James Duddridge, then Minister 
in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) responsible for the territories, was in the 
‘Leave’ camp. He argued that:  
 
An independent Britain can spend more time developing our historic ties rather than be 
shackled by the regulation and political infrastructure that is a federal union. OTs value 
the relationship with the UK more than the EU. The EU is sucking the life out of the 
UK as an independent nation state (Caribbean Insight, 2016, p. 4).  
 
Additionally, Conservative MP and Chair of the All-Party Group on fostering good 
relations between Parliament and the territories, Andrew Rosindell, was a committed 
‘Brexiter’. Liam Fox, former Defence Secretary, described the EU’s role in Falkland Islands 
security as “an irrelevance” (Benwell & Pinkerton, 2016, p. 12). Michael Howard, a former 
Conservative Party leader, not recognising the important role of the EU in mitigating tensions 
between Spain and Gibraltar, indicated that the UK might act similarly to protect Gibraltar as 
it had done with the Falkland Islands in 1982:  
 
Thirty-five years ago this week, another woman Prime Minister sent a taskforce 
halfway across the world to defend the freedom of another small group of British people 
against another Spanish-speaking country, and I’m absolutely certain that our current 
Prime Minister will show the same resolve in standing by the people of Gibraltar (The 
Independent, 2017). 
 
Rightly, such comments were criticised as “hilarious” and “unhelpful” (The 
Independent, 2017); but they do reflect the sensibility of many Brexiters. These were clear 
indications that ‘friends’ of the territories, when it came to getting the UK out of the EU, 
conveniently ignored the territories’ interests. Indeed, all territory governments wanted the UK 
to remain an EU member state. Gibraltar was especially forthright in its support of this 
outcome, because it is part of the EU and its residents were able to vote in the referendum. 
Despite the UK as a whole voting to ‘Leave’, in Gibraltar there was a very clear vote to 
‘Remain’ by 19,322 to 823. However, as Gibraltar’s chief minister, Fabian Picardo, said, these 
votes “did not even move the needle” (The Economist, 2016). And, as Hannay (2018, n.d.) 
claimed, the strength of the vote “… seems to cut no ice with the Brexiters who seem to be 
barely aware that they are throwing Gibraltar under the wheels of a Spanish bus”. 
 
So: why were the territories so strongly in favour of the UK remaining part of the EU? 
Since the UK’s accession in 1973, the EU has been a key interlocutor for the territories, and in 
recent years the bonds between them have strengthened, underpinned by Council Decision 
2013/755/EU on the Association of the Overseas Countries and Territories with the EU 
(‘Overseas Association Decision’, OAD) (Official Journal of the EU, 2013). The agreement 
                                               Small States & Territories, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018, pp. 149-168 
 
 
153
aimed to modernise the relationship between the territories and the EU, “moving beyond 
development cooperation and focusing on a reciprocal relationship based on mutual interests” 
(European Commission, 2016). The only UKOT to stand outside of the OAD is Gibraltar, due 
to it being part of the EU itself. The advantages derived from the EU relationship are various, 
and in many cases significant: focused particularly around security (see the discussion above), 
trade, aid, free movement of citizens, and policy dialogue. Note, however, that any accruing 
benefits flowing from the UK’s current EU membership vary between the territories. 
 
Trade 
The territories have free access to the EU market, and this is particularly important for 
several of them. For the Falkland Islands, the EU is the primary market for its fishery products 
(94% of exports) and the industry accounts for 40% of GDP. In 2016 the industry contributed 
two-thirds of corporation tax receipts (Falkland Islands Government, 2018). The vast majority 
of fish exports enter the EU via the Port of Vigo in Spain. Moreover, most Falkland Islands 
fishing companies operate joint ventures with Spanish companies, which are facilitated by 
provisions under Title II of the OAD (Definition of the Concept of Originating Products) 
(Official Journal of the EU, 2013). These allow vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, Spain 
to operate in the Falkland Islands. Also, the EU accepts 33% of the meat produced in the 
Falkland Islands; a key sector for the territory’s farmers (Falkland Islands Government, 2018). 
For Tristan da Cunha, the EU market is increasingly important for its high quality and 
sustainably sourced lobster. After many years of negotiation, the first Tristan da Cunha lobster 
was imported into the EU in November 2014 (undercurrentnews, 2015). As Chris Carnegy, 
UK representative for the territory, argued,  
 
Our ability to import [lobster] to the EU tariff-free is extremely valuable. That part of 
the market for us is 9% of the total, but being in high-end restaurants in Paris and Berlin 
helps us to set the price of the other 91% around the world (House of Lords European 
Union Committee, 2017c, p. 8).  
 
For Gibraltar, its shipping trade, and online gaming industry that employs around 3,500 
people, representing over 18% of private sector jobs, have grown as a result of free access to 
the EU (Government of Gibraltar, 2016). In addition, Gibraltar has sizeable interests in 
investment services, insurance and banking. These are supported by an EU agreement that 
allows licensed institutions in Gibraltar to provide services across the EU without having to 
seek separate authorisation in host member states (Clegg, 2016, p. 546). Free access is also 
crucial for Anguilla and Montserrat, but with their Euro-Caribbean neighbours. For instance, 
the majority of Anguilla’s oil comes via St Eustatius, and St Martin is the main market for its 
fish. For Montserrat, the French and Dutch territories are important markets for its sand and 
aggregate exports (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2017b; 2017c). 
 
Aid 
 
Total EU bilateral funding for the territories (excluding Gibraltar) via the 11th 
European Development Fund (EDF) 2014-2020, is €76.8 million. Regional funding is worth 
another €100 million, which supports projects involving the UKOTs along with French and 
Dutch non-self-governing territories in the Caribbean and Pacific (UKOTA, 2016b, p. 11). EU 
funding gives important help to the territories, particularly for some that are not in receipt of 
UK development assistance, for instance the British Virgin Islands and the Falkland Islands. 
For the latter, funds sustain critical infrastructure and environment research (Falkland Islands 
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Government, 2018). “A significant amount” of EU aid is helping to maintain the economic 
viability of Pitcairn that struggles to cover its budgetary expenditure; the territory is also part 
of a ‘regional envelope’ shared with French Polynesia, Wallis and Futune, and New Caledonia. 
Montserrat also receives support, despite budgetary aid from the UK. As Donaldson Romeo, 
Premier of Montserrat, has argued, the territory is “hugely dependent” on EU funding (House 
of Lords European Union Committee, 2017c, p. 19). For Gibraltar almost €60 million has been 
disbursed since 1990 (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2017a). Government 
records indicate that 3,615 jobs have been created or safeguarded as a result of EU-funded 
projects; there have also been over 5,000 qualifications gained, with support from the European 
Regional Development Fund Investment for Growth and Jobs Goal Programme (MercoPress, 
2016; ERDF, n.d.). For St Helena, 11th EDF funding is being used to improve 
telecommunications connectivity to the island, while under the 10th EDF a project is being 
supported to convert biodegradable waste into biogas and renewable energy (St Helena 
Government, 2017, p. 2). 
 
Free movement 
 
The freedom to travel, work, study and reside in the EU – and vice versa – is an 
important benefit for the territories, most of whose residents are UK citizens (Official Journal 
of the EU, 2012, pp. 56–58) and whose economies often depend heavily on imported talent and 
skilled labour. This is particularly crucial for Gibraltar, with its difficult relationship with 
Spain. Ten thousand Spanish citizens cross the border every day to work in Gibraltar, while 
almost 10 million visitors enter the territory via Spain each year (Government of Gibraltar, 
2016). Anguilla is also heavily dependent on a European neighbour for its tourists; 90% use St 
Martin as their hub (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2017b, p. 2). Moreover, 
Pitcairners appreciate the freedom of movement to French Polynesia, including for medical 
treatment. 
 
Policy dialogue 
 
Institutional links with the EU are also important, particularly the European 
Commission, via its Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development 
(DEVCO). Also, there are several associated groups to facilitate cooperation. The Overseas 
Countries and Territories (OCT) – EU Forum brings together OCT governments (including the 
UKOTs), the European Commission and member states. There are also tripartite meetings 
between the Commission, the OCTs and the member states to which they are linked. 
Partnership working parties are the third form of policy dialogue. These act in an advisory 
capacity and provide a framework for technical discussions on particular areas of policy. 
Finally, there is the Overseas Countries and Territories Association, which helps to facilitate 
cooperation amongst the OCTs (OCTA, 2018a). Gibraltar stands somewhat apart: it has more 
direct ties with the European Commission and has formal representation in the European 
Parliament. 
 
What next? 
 
It is clear from the preceding paragraphs that the relationship with the EU provides 
important additional benefits, across a range of different areas, and using a range of approaches, 
beyond those which are offered by the UK. Currently, the territories are pushing the UK 
Conservative government to remain as close to the EU as possible. As has been argued, the 
“EU’s approach to the 25 OCTs of their member states is less dominant, dictatorial or intrusive 
                                               Small States & Territories, Vol. 1, No. 2, 2018, pp. 149-168 
 
 
155
[than the UK’s]” (West India Committee, 2018, p. 10); while an official from the British Virgin 
Islands has said, “In many cases, some territories benefit more from the EU relationship than 
the relationship with Britain” (Wheatley, 2018). Leslie Jaques, Pitcairn’s representative in 
Europe, argued, “… to lose all of that [aid] for us would be quite catastrophic” (House of Lords 
European Union Committee, 2017c, p. 6). For the Falkland Islands, with its reliance on Spanish 
markets and Spanish vessels for its fish exports, the view of its government is quite clear. It 
has stated that, without an alternative trade agreement [with the EU]: 
 
the Falkland Islands would most likely lose its market in Spain … [and] would lose its 
market in all other EU member states (Falkland Islands Government, 2018). 
 
And Chief Minister of Gibraltar, Fabian Picardo, has said, Brexit presents “few 
opportunities worthy of mention” and that losing access to the Single Market in services would 
be a “severe blow” (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2017a, p. 11). Similarly for 
the Falkland Islands there is grave doubt that other markets offer the same opportunities as the 
present EU market. As its government argued: 
 
… retaining current tariff and quota free access to EU markets is critically important. 
Anything other than this would have a detrimental impact on the income of the Falkland 
Islands Government and the wider economy (Falkland Islands Government, 2018). 
 
Beyond trade, a particular worry is in relation to the provision of aid. As referred to 
previously, all the territories, to some extent, receive EU financial support. The Premier of the 
British Virgin Islands, D. Orlando Smith, said that “the EU is essentially a partner in our 
economic development” (House of Lords European Union Committee 2017c, p. 3), whilst 
Anguilla’s Representative to the UK and EU, Blondel Cluff, has argued that “our main source 
of sustainable and significant developmental aid comes from the EU” (Foreign Affairs 
Committee 2018a, Q54). The UK government has given no assurances about funding beyond 
2020, and at the present time most territories do not qualify for receipt of UK overseas aid.  
 
A related concern is the strength of the UK economy going forward, and the impact that 
might have on government expenditure. For example, several studies have suggested that the 
UK’s economy will weaken after Brexit, including from the UK Treasury (HM Treasury, 
2016a; 2016b). One study found that all of the UK Government’s four Brexit scenarios, 
including a tailor-made deal, would leave the UK poorer and cost taxpayers hundreds of 
millions of pounds each week (Global Future, 2018). So, even were the UK to loosen its 
funding rules for the territories (and there is no evidence at the moment that it does), it is 
questionable – given many other competing demands for resources – that the UKOTs would 
receive much in addition. 
 
The UK government has established two Joint Ministerial Councils – one for Gibraltar 
and the second for the other territories – to help resolve the Brexit-related issues affecting them. 
Whilst some reassurances have been given, for example that the UK will remain party to the 
11th EDF until its closure, there is still great uncertainty over what a post-Brexit relationship 
with the EU will look like – if there is one at all. The real concern across the territories is that 
the advantages accrued via their links to the EU with a ‘hard’ or even with a softer Brexit will 
be lost. The trade advantages, the bilateral and regional aid disbursements, the collective 
recognition of UK sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar, free movement across 
the EU, and political influence in Brussels are all at risk. Also, there are fears that, if a final 
deal is agreed, the interests of the territories will be side-lined, and potentially they might not 
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be included in any final deal. This is particularly concerning for Gibraltar, which is part of the 
EU and is heavily reliant on a fluid border with Spain. As David Hannay (2018, n.d.), a member 
of the House of Lords and former UK ambassador to the EU, has argued: 
 
On Gibraltar there is effectively nothing agreed. Nothing about the situation on the day 
Gibraltar leaves the EU, which is necessarily the day the UK leaves. Nothing about the 
situation during the 21-month transitional period. Nothing about Gibraltar’s situation 
under the new relationship thereafter between the UK and the EU. The only thing that 
is settled – on the EU’s side – is that any agreement has to be agreed by Spain. And that 
is hardly a plus. 
 
Indeed, there are suggestions that Spain wants to incorporate an annex into any Brexit 
deal that would limit Gibraltar’s special status going forward. At present, Gibraltar is not part 
of the EU’s customs union, it is exempted from the Common Agricultural Policy and it does 
not apply VAT. It has been reported that Spain would like to reduce tobacco smuggling 
(Gibraltar is the biggest entry point for illegal tobacco products into Spain), improve conditions 
for its cross-border workers, and introduce stricter tax residence criteria to prevent businesses 
that operate in Spain from registering in Gibraltar for tax-avoidance reasons. Madrid also 
would like joint use of Gibraltar’s airport. One source was quoted as saying, “… it is inevitable 
that Gibraltar will come closer to Spain” (El Pais, 2018, n.d.). 
 
The Brexiters have either ignored these concerns or downplayed them. Rather, much 
has been made of the trade opportunities once the UK leaves the EU (see for example, The 
Telegraph, 2017). However, the Falkland Islands government makes clear: 
 
Developing new, non-EU export markets for fishery products will be difficult outside 
of free trade agreements that allow similar access to what is currently enjoyed within 
the EU. This is particularly the case in the Asian markets where demand is highest but 
competition is strong, and both political and tariff barriers exist (Falkland Islands 
Government, 2018). 
 
Of course the Brexit talks are not concluded, and it is possible that the UK government 
will agree to a ‘softer’ version, which means a relatively strong alignment with the EU. And 
the closer the UK remains to the EU, the better the outcome for the territories. However, even 
if this does happen, a significant breach in relations with the territories has already taken place. 
The notion that the UK is a “benign patron”, “reliable”, and a “protector” has been seriously 
tarnished because of the negative political, economic, social, environmental and diplomatic 
impact even a soft Brexit will have. Also, the rhetoric of those Conservative MPs who have 
stood foursquare behind the territories, particularly the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar over 
their disputes with Argentina and Spain respectively, have been found wanting, and their 
support will not have the same weight in the future. 
 
Irma and its aftermath 
 
The impact of Irma, a Category 5 hurricane, on three territories (Anguilla, the British 
Virgin Islands, and the Turks and Caicos Islands) on 6 and 7 September 2017 was very serious, 
causing significant structural damage and the deaths of at least six people. In the British Virgin 
Islands, about 80% of all buildings were damaged or destroyed; the total economic loss was 
about US$3 billion, equivalent to 300% of GDP; and the economy could contract by as much 
as 30-40% in 2017-18 (Wheatley, 2018). In the immediate aftermath the UK’s response was 
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criticised, both in terms of preparing for the coming of Irma and the humanitarian effort that 
followed. The latter was described as “pathetic” and “sorely lacking” by those in, or 
representing, the territories, and several Conservative MPs felt the response was “too slow”; 
(The Guardian, 2017a; 2017b; BBC News, 2017). Some preparations had been made: the 
Royal Fleet Auxiliary ship, Mounts Bay, was already in the region, with humanitarian aid, 
marines and engineers on board, but it became clear very quickly that this was not going to be 
enough to support the three territories approximately 1,600 km apart.  
 
There was also the view that a degree of political commitment was lacking from the 
UK. Both French President Emmanuel Macron and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte visited 
their respective territories; UK Prime Minister Theresa May did not. It was certainly the case 
that France, the Netherlands, and the UK all struggled in their response to Hurricane Irma; but 
a common view was that many in the UKOTs and in Westminster felt that the UK’s specific 
preparations prior to Irma, and its immediate response, fell short of what was required. The UK 
then sent more help, and ultimately there were 2,000 military personnel, 40 aid experts, 50 
police officers, 40 prison officers, and 80 FCO staff assisting the territories (Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2018b). Despite this, the delay in providing a fuller range of support was 
damaging, and mitigated the positive later efforts of the UK. In reflecting on the UK’s response, 
the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee noted soberly that “there are lessons to be 
learned” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018b, p. 3). 
 
Many of the issues and concerns highlighted by the Foreign Affairs Committee were 
shared by the territories themselves. One was the belief that they were unable to access 
sufficient funding. First, there was a perceived problem in relation to OECD rules which say 
that higher income countries (which the territories are) do not qualify for development 
assistance, including hurricane relief. This is the case, but it was a rather disingenuous 
argument put forward by the UK government. First, the UK could have found funds from 
elsewhere, i.e. the Treasury, rather than the international development budget. Second, the UK 
has long-promoted the idea that the territories should be economically self-sufficient, and so 
funding has been kept to a minimum. The position of the UK is encapsulated in the following 
quote from William Hague, then Foreign Secretary, on launching the 2012 White Paper on the 
Overseas Territories:  
 
We expect these territories to do all that is necessary to reduce … their reliance on 
subsidies from the British taxpayer (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012).  
 
As one FCO official explained when giving evidence on the hurricane reconstruction 
efforts:  
 
A lot of our focus is on supporting [the territories] to make their own preparations and 
have their own disaster infrastructure in place (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018a, 
Q44). 
 
But, as the Foreign Affairs Committee recommended, the UK should offer “greater 
preventative investment [and] be more active in making the OTs as resilient as possible to 
major natural disasters” (Foreign Affairs Committee, 2018b, p. 11). 
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The territories were also frustrated that their particular non-sovereign status excluded 
them from accessing international reconstruction funds, in particular their inability to benefit 
from a United Nations donors conference held in November 2017. As Blondel Cluff noted: 
 
[We] witnessed US$1.4 billion being awarded to Barbuda and Dominica, and we could 
not utter a word. Nor could we receive funds without the UK’s permission, which was 
not granted … This is an example of our political voice being mute (Foreign Affairs 
Committee 2018a, Q59). 
 
Some support has been given by the UK for longer-term reconstruction, but for the 
British Virgin Islands, for example, it has come in the form of a £300 million loan guarantee 
and a private sector task force (Wheatley, 2018); rather than direct aid, which several 
independent states, such as Dominica, have received. The British Virgin Islands accepted the 
support, but there were reservations about assuming a £300 million ‘debt’ at a time of national 
crisis, and that it was the private sector rather than the UK government that had been assigned 
the responsibility to assist with recovery and reconstruction. One official from the territory 
noted that “the problem [should not be] pawned off on the private sector” (Wheatley, 2018). 
Also, the loan came with conditions: the UK established an agency to monitor the British 
Virgin Islands’ spending of the loan, and will also conduct an audit of its public finances. One 
opposition legislator in the territory likened the requirements to “economic slavery” (Cayman 
Compass, 2018a). 
 
The immediate response of the UK to the destruction caused by Hurricane Irma and the 
longer-term plans for reconstruction have proved controversial and opened up a second front 
of dispute between the UK and its territories; in this case with those in the Caribbean. The 
perceived slowness of the UK’s reaction; the lack of access to international funds; and the UK’s 
desire to place most of the financial burden for reconstruction on the territories themselves 
have raised questions about the UK’s ultimate responsibility and concern when a crisis hits. 
This is despite the fact that the 2012 White Paper notes: 
 
The UK Government recognises its responsibility to support a territory facing a disaster 
(Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2012). 
 
A new hurricane preparedness plan has been recently agreed (UK Government, 2018); 
but concerns remain in the territories over the longer-term financial commitment of the UK, at 
a time when financial retrenchment continues to be enacted in London. Indeed, it has been 
noted by many that HMS Ocean, the vessel which helped with the later relief effort, has since 
been withdrawn from service and sold to Brazil (Forces Network, 2018). 
 
Cracks in the policy consensus 
 
Over recent decades, both Conservative and Labour governments in the UK have 
largely shared the same approach to the territories, across the main aspects of policy. However, 
that consensus has started to crack. The Labour Party, now led by Jeremy Corbyn, has been 
more forthright in its criticism of some of the territories, particularly in relation to their offshore 
financial centres. Corbyn has argued that, if they do not make radical changes, then direct rule 
from London should be considered. He has drawn parallels with the decision of the last Labour 
government to impose direct rule on the Turks and Caicos Islands, saying that direct control of 
the UKOTs could be done “almost immediately” (Politico, 2016). In a debate on 11 April 2016, 
he argued, the “national scandal [of tax avoidance] has got to end” (House of Commons 
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Hansard, 2016). It is of course the case that, over the last 15 to 20 years, domestic and 
international oversight of offshore finance has increased, with pressure coming from such 
organisations as the OECD, the Financial Action Task Force and IMF (Palan, Murphy & 
Chavagneux, 2010; Sharman, 2006; Vlcek, 2008). For its part, the UK has coaxed the territories 
to clean up their financial services industries, and align themselves to international norms. 
There had always been a line beyond which Conservative and Labour politicians would not go 
in calling for more radical reform; however, this reticence has recently dissipated. The shift has 
taken place because of the Labour Party’s move leftwards in its approach to economic 
management, and due to the scandals that have highlighted some of the less transparent aspects 
of the territories’ financial industries, particularly in relation to the Panama Papers in 2015 and 
the Paradise Papers in 2017. Moreover, the poisoning of Sergei Skripal and his daughter in the 
UK in March 2018, allegedly by the Russian government, focused attention on how the UKOTs 
are used by Russian interests to transfer illicit funds. Indeed, the role of the territories was a 
key focus in a Foreign Affairs Committee report, which stated: 
 
… money laundering is now a matter of national security, and therefore constitutionally 
under the jurisdiction of the UK. The Overseas Territories … are important routes 
through which dirty money enters the UK. This cannot continue (Foreign Affairs 
Committee, 2018b, p. 23).  
 
In this environment, together with a House of Commons without a Conservative 
majority, the Government agreed on 1 May 2018 to accept an amendment to the Sanctions and 
Anti-Money Laundering Bill that had support from Labour, but also a handful of Conservative 
MPs (BBC News, 2018). This will require the territories in the Caribbean and Bermuda to 
create publicly accessible registers with details of the beneficial ownership of companies; 
something they had long resisted and which also further than what present international 
regulatory norms demand. Perhaps predictably, the reaction of the territories was very negative, 
particularly in those that had long held responsibility for the management of offshore finance. 
For example, Orlando Smith, Premier of the British Virgin Islands, said: 
 
It is not only a breach of trust but calls into question our very relationship with the UK 
and the constitutional rights of the people of the BVI (The Guardian, 2018).  
 
In a further statement, the British Virgin Islands government said: 
 
We vehemently reject the idea that our democratically elected government should be 
superseded by the UK Parliament, especially in an area which has been entrusted to the 
people of the BVI … This flies in the face of constitutional arrangements made with 
the UK … It also begs the question of how the UK parliament can act so casually with 
a constitution when an entire economy is at stake (Caribbean Insight, 2018, p. 1). 
 
The last part of the quote alludes to the fact that the economy is struggling in the 
aftermath of Irma, and to put further pressure on it is clearly not helpful. The criticisms did not 
only come from politicians; in late May 2018 more than one thousand British Virgin Islanders 
protested against the UK’s decision (Cayman Compass, 2018b). And so, despite the good 
intentions UK politicians may have had, this is the third front which has opened up between 
the territories and the UK. There is a strong feeling across all the territories in the Caribbean, 
but chiefly those affected by Irma, that the actions of the UK Parliament have been heavy 
handed, have damaged their autonomy, and further imperilled their economies. The more 
unfavourable position of the Labour Party under Jeremy Corbyn towards the territories’ 
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offshore industries, and the recent focus on ‘dirty-money’ more generally, has challenged 
further the view of UK benevolence long-held by many in the territories. 
 
Recalibrating relations 
 
The UK’s decision to leave the EU, in particular, along with the controversies regarding 
Irma and the publicly accessible registers of the beneficial ownership of companies, have 
triggered centrifugal forces in the relationship between the UK and its territories. Of course, 
the process is not uniform, and the underlying ties remain intact; but the territories are certainly 
looking for new paths of influence and opportunities to best secure their own interests and 
development. One pre-existing example is that of Bermuda’s third country equivalency under 
Solvency II, the EU’s prudential regulatory regime which sets out rules to develop a single 
market for the insurance sector. It allows third country insurers to operate in the EU without 
complying with all EU rules (Official Journal of the EU, 2016). This agreement is separate 
from other aspects of the UKOT-EU relationship. Thus Europe considers Bermuda to be a 
jurisdiction in its own right, and all treaties, rights, policies and equivalency agreements have 
been negotiated on a third country basis with the EU. As Derrick Binns, Bermuda’s Secretary 
of the Cabinet, has argued:  
 
We achieved it on our own. We achieved it for Bermuda and we do not believe that it 
is linked in any way to the UK’s membership of the European Union (House of Lords 
European Union Committee, 2017c, p. 21).  
 
So: to what extent could this approach be used by other territories to gain greater 
autonomy from the UK, as well as to maintain their links with the EU post-Brexit? 
 
In May 2017, Anguilla introduced a change to allow French nationals from French Saint 
Martin to travel freely to the territory, exempt from passport controls (West India Committee, 
2018, p. 28). Anguilla hopes that some kind of common travel area can be maintained after 
Brexit, and reassurances have been given by neighbouring territories that this may be possible. 
Along with other territories, Anguilla is also lobbying for continued association with the OCTA 
and payments via the EDF, with the UK contributing on a ‘pay as you go’ basis. OCTA 
members are “keen” for the UKOTs to remain associated with the grouping (West India 
Committee, 2017, p. 28), while the EDF has a special status and is managed outside the EU’s 
general budget, and contributions can be made by third countries. In its political declaration 
after the EU-OCT Ministerial Conference in February 2018, OCT representatives suggested 
that the UK could “contribute to the EU financial support earmarked for OCTs . . . with a view 
to maintain UKOTs within or alongside the OCTs grouping” (OCTA, 2018b, p. 9). 
 
Anguilla is also probing the option of being part of the European Grouping of Territorial 
Cooperation (EGTC). This choice might also be open to Gibraltar; as well as to Pitcairn, keen 
to maintain and nurture strong links with French Polynesia. The regulation for the EGTC states: 
 
… a third country or an OCT shall be considered to be neighbouring a [EU] member 
state, including its outermost regions where the third country or the OCT and that 
member state share a common land border or where both the third country or OCT and 
the member state are eligible under a joint maritime cross-border or transnational 
programme under the European territorial cooperation goal, or are eligible under 
another cross-border, sea-crossing or sea-basin cooperation programme, including 
where they are separated by international waters (Regulation EC No. 1082/2006). 
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Other options to maintain a relationship with the EU are being considered by Anguilla 
and the British Virgin Islands in particular. Both are already associate members of the 
Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States and the Caribbean Community, and would like to 
deepen those links. Montserrat is already a full member of both organisations. Moreover, there 
is an appetite to join two other related groups: CARIFORUM (Caribbean Community and 
Dominican Republic) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. By aligning with 
these groups, there might be a possibility of benefiting in some way with these organisations’ 
existing agreements with the EU. There are Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) 
between the EU and CARIFORUM and also the Southern African Development Community 
(SADC); an initialled EPA with West Africa; and an interim EPA with countries in the Pacific. 
So potentially, the territories in the Caribbean, St Helena, Tristan da Cunha and Ascension, and 
Pitcairn could be accommodated in the regional EPAs. This would mean creating an 
arrangement that was not directly tied to the UK, and so would require some flexibility on the 
part of the EU, the regional trading blocs, and the UK itself that would need to endorse any 
deals. But such agreements would tap into existing relations and networks, although for 
territories such as Anguilla, St Helena and Pitcairn – where the Governor has the principal role 
in external affairs – some greater local authority might be required (Hendry & Dickson, 2011, 
pp. 225-245). 
 
Indeed, until recently, there were strong parallels between the ACP and OCT ties with 
the EU. Over the last decade the respective links have diverged; but: could the EPAs be 
appropriate for the territories? They offer free access, with certain exceptions, to ACP goods 
and services (e.g. financial services and tourism) into the EU market. Moreover, the ACP was 
able to keep special protections for small and medium enterprises in some sectors, and the 
EPAs include provisions for short-term visitors for business purposes. Finally, the EU offers 
financial support to ACP countries via the EDF. It is the case that the EPAs are not as 
comprehensive or as advantageous as the present arrangements for the OCTs, but they are 
potentially a route back into the EU. As Benito Wheatley, the British Virgin Islands’ EU 
Representative, has argued,  
 
The ACP Group is the most logical alternative for the BVI because of our similar 
relationship with the EU, and the Territory’s position in the Caribbean where many 
ACP countries are located (Government of the Virgin Islands, 2017). 
 
Among the UKOTs, Gibraltar has arguably most to lose from Brexit. Discussions have 
taken place as to whether it could seek a “microstate-style relationship” with the EU (House of 
Lords European Union Committee, 2017a, p. 25; Gibraltar Panorama, 2016). It would place 
Gibraltar alongside political units such as Andorra, Monaco and San Marino, which have tailor-
made relationships with the EU covering areas such as the single market and freedom of 
movement. Alternatively, it has been suggested that it might be possible “to have an aspect of 
the new agreement between the UK and the EU apply in a different way to Gibraltar”, or at 
least a “nuanced” relationship to facilitate specific local needs, such as the fluid land border 
with Spain (House of Lords European Union Committee, 2017a, p. 25). For instance, the Local 
Border Traffic Regulation (EC/1931/2006) could be maintained in some form (Davis 2017, p. 
3). This could be used as the basis for movement of labour between Spain and Gibraltar. 
Nevertheless, as the House of Lords EU Committee noted: 
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It is not clear that the EU would prioritise special arrangements for a dependent territory 
of a state which is leaving, not joining the EU (House of Lords European Union 
Committee, 2017, p. 26). 
 
The frustrations on the part of the territories with Brexit are clear, and this is causing 
them to look more pro-actively for new alliances. Some territories have more freedom to do 
this than others, particularly those in the Caribbean, but most are doing their utmost to secure 
as best a deal with the EU as possible, either directly or indirectly. In some cases, this means 
trying to extract further autonomy from the UK. Even the UK Government hopes there will be 
a bespoke deal; a July 2018 White Paper noted:  
 
The UK will be seeking specific arrangements for Gibraltar and the other Overseas 
Territories. [They] should take account of the significant and mutually beneficial 
economic ties between these economies and EU member states (HM Government, 
2018, p. 15).  
 
At present, however, there is little detail of what those arrangements might look like. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has provided an analysis of some of the serious issues facing the UK’s 
Overseas Territories, which are putting a degree of pressure on relations with London. Because 
of Brexit, the UK’s response to Irma, and the more critical view of the UK Parliament towards 
the territories’ offshore financial centres, the territories are exploring new options to advance 
their interests that at the very least are pushing against the limits of their ties with the UK. This 
is particularly true of several of the territories in the Caribbean. Many have aspirations of (at 
the very least) more autonomy and possibly independence in the medium-term, propelled by 
their real disgruntlement over recent events. The British Virgin Islands has been particularly 
active in exploring new opportunities. It is true that, for the time being, the recovery from Irma 
will take centre stage. But, once that is complete and with better integration into regional 
bodies, an independent future may be possible; the same goes for Bermuda. For others such as 
Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands, owing to their sovereignty disputes; for Pitcairn and St 
Helena because of small size and isolation; and Montserrat by reason of the ongoing impact of 
the volcano, the UK link will remain paramount. However, even for these territories, the actions 
of the UK government and parliament have dented the confidence of politicians, business 
leaders, and citizens more generally, and placed their economic security at significant risk. 
 
So: returning to the important conceptual framework provided by Baldacchino and 
others noted in the Introduction, the paper has argued that the UK is, and is not seen to be, any 
longer such a benevolent patron, that is reliable and protective. Consequently, the mutual 
accommodation and convenience between the UK and the territories is fraying. Tangible 
benefits still accrue as a result of their close links with the UK: prominent among these remain 
political security; economic support (in several cases); diplomatic representation; and the 
freedom to travel, reside and work in the metropole. But the policy decisions and approaches 
taken recently in London towards the territories, principally within the context of Brexit, will 
unquestionably place them in a less favourable position than in the past. The territories will 
likely become more isolated, more vulnerable, and quite possibly poorer over the next few 
years; and the fact that these changes will happen because of deliberate acts from London 
compound the territories’ sense of anger, disappointment and injustice. 
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